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ISSUE ON APPEAL 
The issue to be determined is whether or 
not the Industrial Comm. erred when it ruled that 
the injury to petitioner did not occur in the course 
of his employment. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1 . The fact that the injury relevant herein 
occurred during a lull in employment is a factor 
of considerable importance to a proper analysis 
of this case. During a lull in employment duties 
when an employee must wait for working conditions 
to be readied it is foreseeable that the worker 
will not sit with his hands folded in contemplation 
and that the worker will engage in conversation 
and even horseplay activities. 
2. The defendants did not raise the issue 
of "arising out of employment" below and are there-
fore foreclosed from raising the issue on appeal. 
Should the court decide to consider the "arising" 
issue it will find the law in a state of confusion. 
There are at least three major schools of thought 
regarding the "arising" issue and it is possible 
that the Prows case created a unique "arising" 
test for Utah horseplay cases. In any event the 
injury to this worker "arose" from his employment 
duty, i.e. to wait. 
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POINT I 
A LULL IN EMPLOYMENT IS AN 
IMPORTANT FACTOR IN A COURSE 
OF EMPLOYMENT ANALYSIS 
Petitioner has addressed the question of 
"course" of employment in some depth in his original 
brief. The fact that the incident relevant herein 
occurred during a lull in employment deserves addit-
ional commentary. 
According to Professor Larson at Larson § 
23.65, "Most cases give considerable weight to 
this factor [lulls in employment] in dealing with 
participants in horseplay". Larson goes on: 
"Employers, whose work requires that 
men wait upon the job for work cond-
itions, ought not to be heard to say 
that an accident, occuring out of the 
very conditions presented by the re-
quired waiting, is not compensable." 
"Men standing and waiting around an 
open fire on a damp December day nat-
urally mill around and talk and even 
, joke and indulge in what might be 
termed fhorseplay . T" 
Petitioner asserts that the Commission reached 
the wrong legal conclusion regarding the "course 
of employment" issue based upon the facts in the 
record especially when the fact that a lull in 
employment existed is considered. 
As will be more fully addressed infra Profess-
or Larson views horseplay as a course of employment 
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issue rather than an arising issue. 
POINT II 
PETITIONERS INJURY AROSE 
OUT OF HIS EMPLOYMENT 
The issue of whether this particular claim-
ant's injury "arose out of his employment" was 
not raised or addressed below. Claimant takes 
the position that the employer has waived the issue 
by failing to raise it. However, because of the 
1988 amendment of §35-1-45 which required that 
the injury both arise out of and in the course 
of employment and the fact that no Utah appellate 
court has addressed the amended version of §45 
the petitioner submits the following argument, 
discussion and authorites for the edificationof 
the Utah Court of Appeals. 
Utah's leading horseplay cases, Prows and 
J. & W. Janitorial were both decided prior to the 
1988 amendment of §35-1-45 Utah Code. The employer 
correctly points out the the amendment altered 
the statute so that an injured worker had to show 
that the accident both arose out of and in the 
course of employment. 
According to Professor Larson, §6.10, The 
Law of Workmen's Compensation, Utah was the only 
state that used the disjunctive "or". Most states 
have long required that a claimant satisfy both 
the arise out of and course of elements in order 
for an injury to be compensable. The 1988 amendment 
merely brought Utah into the mainstream of workmen's 
compensation law. 
From the 1988 amendment to §45 the employer 
jumps to the erroneous conclusion that injuries 
from horseplay can "never arise out of employment". 
See the brief of respondent at pg. 4. It is inter-
esting to note that the employer twice makes this 
bold assertion without supplying a scintilla of 
legal authority to support its position. 
As Professor Larson points out most states 
require that both the "arise" and "course" prongs 
be satisfied. Yet these very states which require 
the fulfillment of both prongs also allow recovery 
for horseplay. Oregon at 204 P. 151, Oklahoma 
at 49 P.2d 1065 and Colorado at 318 P.2d 216. 
These cases are not cited as being factually on 
point with the instant case. They are cited only 
to show that "and" states allow recovery for horse-
play in some circumstances, demonstrating that 
the assertion made by the employer without citation 
to authorites is unfounded. Cites taken from Larson. 
In Prows v. Industrial Comm., 610 P.2d 1362 
(Ut. 1983) the Utah Supreme Court, in a somewhat 
confusing opinion, seemed to apply the 4-part test 
advocated by Larson and adopted by the Court to 
both the arising and course criteria. Prows at 
1367 (last paragraph). This approach seems accept-
able to Professor Larson who states at §23.60 of 
his Treatise that: "Whenever the basic controversy 
stems from the nature of a course of conduct delib-
erately undertaken by the claimant, there is primar-
ily a question of course of employment." (Under-
scoring added). Larson goes further: "The 'arising 
out of employment* issue, once it has been decided 
that the horseplay activity itself was no deviation 
from employment, can usually be easily disposed 
of." "...the arising out of employment" issue 
can simply be met by the argument that if the activ-
ity itself qualifies as part of the employment, 
and the horseplay arose out of that activity, then 
the harm arises out of the employment of which 
that activity was a part." This approach may be 
the same that was undertaken by the Utah Supreme 
Court in Prows. 
Larson at §6.10 says in reference to the 
"arising out of and in the course of employment 
statutory language that, "Few groups of statutory 
words in history of law had to bear the weight 
of such a mountain of interpretation as has been 
heaped on this slender foundation". Larson goes 
on: "...it should never be forgotten that the 
basic concept of compensation coverage is unitary, 
not dual, and is best expressed in the term "work 
connection". 
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As to the very complex matter of determining 
when an injury arises out of employment Professor 
Larson at §6.20 et. seq. of his Treatise identifies 
five lines of interpretation of which two are obso-
lete. The three current schools of thought on 
the arising out of issue are: 
1) Increased risk theory. This is the most 
prevalent theory and can be satisifed by showing 
that the employment increased the risk of the expos-
ure . 
2) Actual risk theory. This theory is foll-
owed by a substantial number of court that 
say: "We do not care whether the risk was 
also common to the public, if in fact it 
was a risk of this employment". 
3) Positional risk theory. "An important 
and growing number of courts are accepting the 
full implications of the positional-risk test". 
An injury arises out of the employment if it would 
not have occurred but for the fact that the condit-
ions and obligations fo the employment placed the 
claimant in a position where he was injured." 
At §23.10 Larson says: "...The claimant was injured 
not merely while he was in the factory, but because 
he was in the factory, in touch with associations 
and conditions inseparable from factory life. 
The risks of such associations and conditions were 
risks of the employment." 
CONCLUSION 
It is clearly wrong to make the assertion 
that an injury occurring during horseplay can never 
arise out of employment. Depending on the circum-
stances of the particular case an injury occuring 
during horseplay may arise out of employment if: 
A. There is a work connection; or 
B. The horseplay did not amount to a substan-
tial deviation; or 
C. The jobsite increased the risk; or 
D. Horseplay was an actual risk of employ-
ment; or 
E. But for the employment, the claimant 
would not have been in a position to be injured. 
Under the facts of the instant case, based 
upon the lull in employment and the facts found 
by the A.L.J. Mr. Wallenmeyer is entitled to compen-
sation . 
Dated this^yday of fKJ^K , 1990. 
Robert B r 4e z 
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